Il modello burocratico di pubblica amministrazione, basato sulla supremazia dei politici, è stato ribaltato nel modello proposto dal NPM, nel quale è affermata la “supremazia dei manager”. Il presente lavoro si propone di investigare tramite un’analisi di casi multipli: (i) come politici e manager percepiscono la loro interazione e i rispettivi ruoli durante il processo di bilancio; (ii) quali variabili possono essere rilevanti al fi ne di spiegare tali percezioni e comportamenti. Dall’analisi svolta non emerge un modello dicotomico della relazione tra politici e dirigenti. Piuttosto, le loro relazioni possono essere lette in termini di integrazione sequenziale, di condivisione e in alcuni casi di “confusione”. Il contesto organizzativo, la tipologia dell’attività svolta dal settore e i fattori individuali sembrano essere in grado di infl uenzare il ruolo rispettivamente svolto da politici e dirigenti.
The bureaucratic model of public administration based on the primacy of politicians has been reversed in the model proposed by the New Public Management. In this new model, the primacy of politics gives way to the re-discovery of management. By analysing multiple cases of Italian LGs we investigate: (i) how politicians and managers perceive their relationships and respective roles during the accounting cycle, (ii) if there are variables, which can be relevant in explaining such perceptions and behaviours. Results show that a model of neat separation between politicians and managers cannot be depicted. Rather, alternatively patterns of sequential or reciprocal integration emerge, together with some cases of “confusion”. Organizational factors, type of activity carried out by the department and individual-cognitive factors seem to infl uence the role played by politi-cians and managers.
The bureaucratic model of public administration based on the primacy of politicians has been reversed in the model proposed by the New Public Management. In this new model, the primacy of politics gives way to the re-discovery of management. By analysing multiple cases of Italian LGs we investigate: (i) how politicians and managers perceive their relationships and respective roles during the accounting cycle, (ii) if there are variables, which can be relevant in explaining such perceptions and behaviours. Results show that a model of neat separation between politicians and managers cannot be depicted. Rather, alternatively patterns of sequential or reciprocal integration emerge, together with some cases of “confusion”. Organizational factors, type of activity carried out by the department and individual-cognitive factors seem to infl uence the role played by politi-cians and managers.
